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• The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the proposed prevention and
correction of macroeconomic imbalances regulation (EIP) are designed to
avoid imbalances. However, these instruments overlap, and need clarification.
• Both the ESRB and the Commission, which is given certain powers by the EIP,
must identify and act early on risks. Acting in the face of strong economic
and political pressure is difficult. Complementing the current approach with
transparent and rules-based mechanisms will reduce this problem.
• The EIP and ESRB can complement each other in terms of analysis and
policy, and close collaboration will be vital. The EIP regulation can be used to
ensure that ESRB recommendations are followed up. In the area of financial
recommendations relevent to macroeconomic imbalances, the Commission
should have a more formal requirement to act on ESRB recommendations.
The EIP regulation would benefit from a clause allowing recommendations to
be addressed not only to member states.
• Conflicts between the ESRB and Commission could arise. In this case, the
Treaty requires the Commission to issue a recommendation even if the ESRB
issues a negative finding.
• Legally, it might not be possible to exclude the use by the Commission of
confidential information obtained in the ESRB. 
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and consists of two basic pillars. The European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), operational since
January, is tasked with preventing instability in
the financial system. The second pillar is a regu-
lation analogous to the Stability and Growth Pact,
which will allow the European Commission, via the
Council, to give recommendations to EU member
states to prevent and correct macroeconomic
imbalances. This regulation, on the prevention and
correction of macroeconomic imbalances (known
as the EIP regulation), is at the time of writing in
the legislative process3.
The EIP regulation would constitute a significant
step towards more effective macroeconomic sur-
veillance in the EU. It is a tool for detecting macro-
economic imbalances early on, and issuing
preventive policy recommendations. In case sig-
nificant macroeconomic imbalances exist, it can
result in the issuing of corrective policy recom-
mendations that can ultimately be followed by
fines. It remains to be seen which problems and
policy areas the Commission will concentrate
efforts on once the regulation is in place. Certainly,
areas that would jeopardise the proper function-
ing of EMU would need to be looked at. This could
include labour, product and financial markets.
It appears likely that the ESRB and the topics cov-
ered by the EIP regulation will overlap in some
important areas. This Policy Contribution dis-
cusses this overlap and makes proposals for
improving the effectiveness of the framework
where there are overlaps. Moreover, we draw
attention to the fact that discretionary action to
prevent future crises is difficult and that both pil-
lars rely mostly on policy discretion. The new
framework should therefore rely as much as pos-
sible on automatic built-in mechanisms that
increase the resilience of the financial system and
reduce the pro-cyclicality of credit and asset mar-
kets. By doing so, the likelihood and size of macro-
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been discussed in the
Council, with the Council
reaching agreement on
March 18. The European
Parliament's ECON
committee agreed on






are ongoing at the time
of writing.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the run-up to the financial crisis, significant
macroeconomic imbalances built up in the euro
area. Too low financing costs led to a misalloca-
tion of capital. Households and corporations both
increased their borrowing and amassed substan-
tial private sector debt. The borrowing fuelled
asset price booms, which were particularly strik-
ing in those countries with the greatest underly-
ing credit dynamics1.
The flip-side to the build up of these credit and
asset driven imbalances was increased current
account deficits and a gradual erosion of compet-
itiveness, together with increases in external
debt2. The imbalances have proved highly damag-
ing for the cohesion of the euro area, and some
imbalances have spilled over to other euro-area
economies. Spain, for example, witnessed a hous-
ing bubble and a private-sector credit boom, which
were essentially sustained by significant capital
inflows. These capital inflows were associated
with big current account deficits and led to a sharp
increase in Spain's external liabilities. The correc-
tion of these imbalances has strong effects on
domestic demand and growth; it also severely
impacts on public finances and on the banking
system. Similarly, the bust in the Irish real-estate
market undermines the stability of the Irish and
euro-area financial systems. The real-estate boom
is thus both a macroeconomic imbalance and a
significant source of systemic risk.
Until now, the EU has not had effective mecha-
nisms to address macroeconomic imbalances
that are not fiscal. In fact, the EU macroeconomic
surveillance framework prior to the crisis was
almost exclusively focused on fiscal discipline.
Recognising the importance of non-fiscal imbal-
ances, the EU is reforming its policy framework in
order to prevent similar imbalances from emerg-
ing in the future. The new framework is broadersignificantly diminished. At the same time, it is
clear that considerable discretionary action
remains vital to addressing imbalances that are
specific to an individual country and would not be
addressed by a rules-based framework.
The Policy Contribution is structured as follows.
The next section shows that many macroeco-
nomic imbalances and systemic risks are linked,
and will often require similar policy action. Section
3 clarifies the policy framework and section 4
makes suggestions for an improved framework.
2 MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND SYSTEMIC
RISK
Macroeconomic imbalances are often reflected in
the strong and persistent divergence in euro-area
current accounts and have led to a build-up of
large external debt positions in a number of euro-
area countries (see Figures 1 and 2).
The external divergence has been driven by
significant differences in national credit
developments. Figure 3 shows that between 1999
and 2007 the average growth of private credit in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain was much
higher than the average credit growth in the core
euro-area economies of Austria, France and
Germany. Accordingly, there is a negative
correlation between private sector credit growth
and current account levels.
Unfortunately, not all the capital flows have been
used productively. In fact, the current-account
divergence and the national credit booms have
often gone hand in hand with asset price booms,
in particular in the housing market. Figure 4
shows that real house-price increases have been
much more pronounced in Greece, Ireland and
Spain than in the average of the euro area. The
European Commission (2009) provides evidence
that house price increases have been linked to the
current-account developments, and that the link
is stronger in European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). As housing markets often constitute
an imbalance of macroeconomic relevance, the
European Commission has rightly suggested
including a housing indicator in the 'Scoreboard'
that it plans to use to detect macroeconomic
















































































Figure 1: Current account divergence in selected
euro-area countries (% of GDP)
Source: Ameco.













Figure 2: Net ﬁnancial assets of the total econ-
omy relative to the rest of the world (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, financial accounts. Note: * data for 1999
for Ireland are from 2001. Valuation at market prices


































































Figure 3: Credit growth to the private sector and
average current account levels*
Source: ECB aggregated balance sheet of euro-area mone-
tary financial institutions, excluding the Eurosystem, loans
to 'other euro-area residents'. For current account figure:
European Commission, Ameco database.
* Average annual growth of credit to the non-financial pri-
vate sector during 1999M1-2007M12 and average current
account-to-GDP ratio during the same period.04
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At the same time, it is generally acknowledged
that excessive asset growth is one of the core fac-
tors behind increased financial sector vulnerabil-
ities (Shin 2010). The turning of housing markets
is indeed a major source of financial sector insta-
bility and systemic risk, because it simultane-
ously causes the balance sheets of households to
deteriorate and increases non-performing loans
(see Figure 5). 
Shin (2010) forcefully argues that increased sys-
temic risk from interconnectedness of banks is a
corollary of excessive asset growth. This can be
understood through the example of a simple
stylised financial system with two banks (see
Figure 6). Suppose there is a boom in which the
assets of both banks double in size while the pool
of retail deposits stays fixed. In such a case, the
proportion of banking-sector liabilities in the form
of deposits must fall, while the cross-claims
across the two banks increase in order to finance
the lending boom. The proportion of non-core fund-
ing to core-funding increases.
Thus, an asset price boom and bank lending boom
will be correlated with increased interconnected-
ness of the financial system. Systemic risk will
increase.
An assessment will have to be made of the extent
to which local asset and credit booms in the euro
area have led to an increase in interbank lending
and/or to an increase in cross-border lending
financed directly by depositors. However, it
appears beyond doubt that regional asset booms
in Europe have contributed to the current financial
fragility of the euro area's financial system.
At some stage, the boom comes to an end. This can
be triggered by an external event, but can also
result from the end of bubble dynamics or simply
a growth slowdown. The subsequent bust typically
will be characterised by powerful amplification
mechanisms that render the downturn steep and
deep, and increase the fragility of the financial
system. The macroeconomic downturn impacts on
many financial intermediaries at the same time
through its general impact on asset values and
household and corporate balance sheets. The fail-
ure of one financial intermediary can have conta-
gion effects on one or many other financial
intermediaries, forcing them to sell assets quickly
in order to satisfy their payment obligations. This
in turn will further erode the value of the assets
and put additional strain on the balance sheets4.


















Figure 5: Non-performing loans (% of total loans)
Source: Worldbank, WDI database. Note: Bank nonperform-
ing loans to total gross loans are the value of nonperform-











Figure 6: Stylised ﬁnancial system
Source: Shin (2010).
4. For a good exposition,
see Trichet (2009).
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5. In the same vein, Mervyn
King, the vice-chair of the
ESRB, outlined that the
ESRB will not only have to
rely on supervision but will
make recommendations
that increase the resilience
of the structure of the
financial system (public
hearing at the European
Parliament, 2 May 2011).
6. In fact, the ECB vice
president has already made
clear statements in that
direction: “We could also
have warned about housing
market bubbles in Spain




“These are examples of
things that the ESRB would
have done to prevent crises.
If a body such as the
systemic risk board, with so
many members, issues
concrete recommendations
of that sort, then something
would have to happen”. See
Financial Times (2011) ‘EU
authority to head off
economic crises’, 4 Jan.
7. The Basel III regulation
already foresees some
steps in the direction of
anti-cyclical capital buffers
but these remain largely
discretionary.
Policy response
It is clear from the description of systemic risk
that a macro-prudential policy response cannot
rely on micro-policy instruments only. Micropru-
dential policy instruments can make financial
intermediaries more resilient. However to prevent
systemic risk, one would likely need to rely on
instruments that prevent the primary causes of
systemic risk: asset prices and the asset side of
banks’ balance sheets more generally. For exam-
ple, higher capital ratios help to make financial
intermediaries more resilient by increasing their
capacity to absorb losses. However, the macro-
economic feed-back mechanisms described
above are too powerful: a severe downturn will
eventually render even a well-capitalised banking
system vulnerable. This can currently be seen in
Spain, where the financial system is under severe
stress despite the significant anti-cyclical capital
rules (dynamic provisioning) that were in place
before the crisis. 
Addressing systemic risk will therefore often have
to involve the prevention of excessive asset price
growth and other drivers of macroeconomic
imbalances. By reducing asset price booms, the
interconnectedness of the financial system
typically will also be addressed and systemic risk
decreases5. Similarly, to prevent macroeconomic
imbalances, the structural factors that increase
the likelihood of asset price cycles would need to
be changed. The European Commission may
therefore wish to issue recommendations to the
mortgage and credit markets, and on housing
taxation, with the aim of reducing real-estate
imbalances.
Recommendations to prevent systemic risk could
thus be of a very similar nature to the recommen-
dations for preventing macroeconomic imbal-
ances. Both would involve addressing excessive
asset price and credit booms, thereby increasing
the resilience of the financial system6.
Asset bubbles: difficult to detect and preventive
action will face opposition
There are two central challenges when one wants
to prevent asset price and credit bubbles, which
both the ESRB and the EIP procedure must deal
with. First, an imbalance needs to be detected
early on. This is not an easy task. Although signif-
icant progress has been made in improving the
empirical methodologies suitable for detecting
such imbalances, reasonable economists will con-
tinue to disagree on whether an asset price bubble
is building up. Second, even if a majority of econ-
omists agree that a bubble is building up, any
institution intending to actually stop the boom will
face formidable resistance. This resistance will
come from the financial system itself, but there
will also be strong resistance from the political
side and the electorate at large, as all essentially
benefit from the boom.
Rules versus discretion
It is difficult to detect imbalances and it can be
hard to act while the party is in full swing. For
these reasons, there is a limit to what can be
expected from discretionary action aimed at pre-
venting imbalances early on. To overcome the
political economy pressures and the informational
problems, one should therefore rely as much as
possible on rules-based tools that are suitable for
reducing the pro-cyclicality of credit, asset prices
and the interconnectedness of the financial
system. Brunnermeier et al (2009) have made
proposals on the kind of financial instruments
suitable for such a purpose, and more work in this
direction should be pursued.
In EMU, such more or less automatic measures are
particularly suited to addressing macroeconomic
divergences, and will also help to address sys-
temic risk. For them to be effective, they will have
to be related to national economic developments,
not to the euro-area aggregate. By doing so, the
macroeconomic divergence across countries
would be dampened and the built up of excessive
debt would be reduced. Capital requirements
could, for example, be made dependent on the
national credit cycle using a simple rule7. This
would apply to all credit extended to residents of
the country, irrespective of the residency of the
financial intermediary extending the loan. After-
tax interest rate differentials could be reduced by
harmonising the taxation of mortgages and credit
in general, thereby reducing one national deter-
minant of the price of assets and credit.06
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Such rules would, however, not   make deep eco-
nomic analysis superfluous. On the contrary, as
the economy evolves, new challenges will arise
requiring new policy responses. Moreover, some
country-specific structural features will require
tailor-made policy recommendations that cannot
be covered by horizontal rules. In practice, it will
therefore be ideal to combine rules that increase
the resilience of the system with continuous mon-
itoring. The aspect of using rules has, however, not
received enough attention to date. In addition, it
should be kept in mind that the EIP aims not only
to prevent imbalances but also to correct major
existing imbalances. This cannot be done through
simple rules, but requires potentially tough and
country-specific policy action.
Macroeconomic imbalances can be unrelated to
systemic risk
Some macroeconomic imbalances may be unre-
lated to credit and asset price booms, or to the
increasing interconnectedness of the financial
system. For example, France8and Italy have seen
a significant deterioration in their global export
market shares, which are not visible to the same
extent in Germany, Spain, Portugal and Greece
(see Figures 7 and 8). These losses reflect a grad-
ual deterioration in export performance and global
competitiveness. However they appear not to be
directly related to financial sector vulnerabilities. 
3 CLARIFYING THE POLICY FRAMEWORK
Scope
This policy contribution focuses on the areas of
overlap between the ESRB and the EIP. Of course,
there are important areas where ESRB and EIP do
not overlap. The EIP would, for example, be con-
cerned with the gradual deterioration of competi-
tiveness and export performance with little
systemic relevance. Also, policy measures in the
labour and product markets that help to correct
macroeconomic imbalances and ease the adjust-
ment to past imbalances will certainly be part of
the EIP but not the ESRB. In turn, an assessment
by the ESRB of the systemic consequences of a
sovereign debt restructuring would not be of pri-
mary concern to the EIP9. Similarly, the ESRB
might also make supervisory recommendations
that have little relevance for the EIP. For example,
recommendations addressing the fragility of sys-
temically important financial institutions (SIFIs)
would certainly not be part of the EIP but could
figure in the ESRB policy tool kit. Figure 9 visu-
alises how the preventive arm of the EIP and ESRB
would overlap.
The draft EIP regulation and the ESRB overlap in
terms of their scope, which in both cases is suffi-
ciently broad to be interpreted as including finan-
cial as well as real economic developments. Box 1
8. See for example, Artus
and Fontagné (2006).
9. Wolff (2011).
‘The EIP procedure is stronger and – as a rule – should adopt the relevant ESRB
recommendations and incorporate them in the EIP. This would also help to make these
recommendations consistent with the broader macroeconomic strategy.’











Figure 7: Market share developments (% world exports)
Source: Ameco database, European Commission.











Figure 8: Market share developments (% world exports)
Source: Ameco database, European Commission.07
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BOX 1: THE LEGALLY DEFINED SCOPE OF THE
ESRB AND THE EIP
Article 3 of the ESRB regulation defines the mission
and objectives of the ESRB: “The ESRB shall be
responsible of the macro-prudential oversight of the
financial system within the Union in order to con-
tribute to the prevention and mitigation of systemic
risks to financial stability in the Union that arise from
developments within the financial system and taking
into account macroeconomic developments, so as to
avoid periods of widespread financial distress. It
shall contribute to the smooth functioning of the
internal markets and thereby ensure a sustainable
contribution of the financial sector to economic
growth.” (Article 3(1))10. The key concept is, of
course, systemic risk, which is defined in Article 2 as
meaning “...a risk of disruption in the financial
system with the potential to have serious negative
consequences for the internal market and the real
economy. All types of financial intermediaries, mar-
kets and infrastructure may be potentially systemi-
cally important to some degree.” Clearly, this is a very
broad definition requiring the new institution to mon-
itor the financial system but also the real economy.  
The draft regulation on the prevention and correction
of macroeconomic imbalances also provides a
definition of its scope. Imbalances are defined as
“macroeconomic developments which are adversely
affecting or have the potential adversely to affect, the
proper functioning of the economy of a Member State
or of economic and monetary union, or of the Union
as a whole” (Article 2). This definition is also very
general. 
The potential for overlap is to some extent recognised
in the Commission’s draft EIP regulation as it makes
a clear reference to the ESRB. It states that the in-
depth reviews shall take into account early warnings
or recommendations from the ESRB relevant to the
member state under review. In turn, the ESRB
regulation does not refer to the EIP, because the EIP
is not yet in place. However, the European
Commission is a member of the ESRB general board
(Article 6.1) and is also represented on the steering
committee (Article 11.1). 
The European Parliament has proposed amendments
to the draft regulation that would require the
Commission to transmit information to the ESRB.
More importantly, the Commission would be required
to take into account the ESRB's warnings to the
extent that they are addressed to a member state or
are relevant to the member state. The Parliament has
also introduced a sentence asking for the
confidentiality regime of the ESRB to be respected11.
Figure 9: The ESRB and the EIP: thematic overlap
presents the details on the legal base. As an exam-
ple, adverse developments in the financial system
can be considered to be harmful for the function-
ing of EMU. But they would certainly also be a sig-
nificant risk to the financial system. Accordingly,
the EIP and the regulation establishing the ESRB
(Regulation (EU) no. 1092/2010) would apply.
There is therefore a potential for overlap, producing
synergies but also conflict.
An overlap may also be likely in terms of policy
instruments. In this respect, there are some areas
where the exclusive competence is evident. In
other areas, the dividing line is less clear and
similar policy instruments could be proposed both
by the ESRB and under the EIP procedure: to
address a real estate bubble, a number of policy
instruments will need to be employed. This may
include recommendations in the area of taxes (eg
tax deductibility of mortgages), banking
regulation (eg maximal loan-to-value ratio) and
recommendations curtailing the supply of credit
in case of an overheating economy (eg higher
bank and borrower equity requirements when
price-rent ratios are higher). Policy
recommendations could also be given to constrain
non-core financing of loans in banks. That would
help to reduce the interconnectedness of the
financial system and also reduce the availability
of credit that is created by moving down the
maturity structure in financial intermediation
(Shin 2010). Finally, one could also think of
macroeconomic policy recommendations in the
field of fiscal policy that would help to offset
private sector borrowing booms. In these areas,
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However, the ESRB and the Commission could also
issue different kinds of policy recommendations
to tackle similar problems. The ESRB may wish to
issue recommendations of a more horizontal
nature to the financial system in general (for
example in the area of micro-prudential policy),
while the Commission would focus on the more
structural recommendations.
Potential for synergies between the ESRB and
EIP
A number of synergies between the ESRB and the
EIP are conceivable in the areas where they over-
lap. First, the different approaches to tackling the
same issues of overlap could be complementary.
The ESRB will see the problems more from the side
of the financial system, employing detailed data
potentially including even bank-level data. The
Commission in the EIP will more naturally take a
more macroeconomic and structural approach. To
maximise the benefits of these two approaches, it
will be important that a close contact and
exchange between the two institutions at all
levels is ensured. 
Second, the comparative strength in terms of
expertise of the staff of two institutions is differ-
ent. Naturally, the ESRB would have a comparative
advantage in financial issues while the Commis-
sion would have a comparative advantage in the
understanding of the country-specific problems in
the structural and macro area. The competences
are thus complementary, and again it will be
important that close contacts between the two
institutions are maintained. This will allow the
assessment by both institutions to be compre-
hensive and targeted to the specificities of the
individual countries.
Third, given the described information and political
economy pressures, a close collaboration of the
two institutions will considerably increase the
leverage of the policy framework. Indeed, ESRB
and EIP pulling in the same direction will certainly
impress all stakeholders and will thereby help
overcoming political economy pressures. The legal
enforcement instruments of the EIP may be con-
sidered complementary to the less public
approach of the ESRB, which can operate in a more
confidential manner behind the scenes. The ESRB
would also have the leverage of the central banks
of the EU and the supervisors behind the scenes.
Finally, the EIP procedure could be used as a pow-
erful tool for increasing the leverage of the ESRB.
While the ESRB is to provide warnings and, where
appropriate, issue recommendations for remedial
action (Article 16(1)), the follow-up to its recom-
mendations is defined in Article 17 and essen-
tially relies on a 'comply-or-explain' principle. Even
if the ESRB considers that the inaction is not suf-
ficiently explained, the only possible follow-up
allowed by the ESRB regulation is public pressure
by making the recommendation public.
In the draft EIP regulation, the follow-up is much
stronger. If the Council, following a recommenda-
tion of the Commission, comes to the conclusion
that an excessive imbalance exists, and it issues
a recommendation according to Article 121(4),
this recommendation is legally binding on the
member state concerned, and the member state
will need to present a very stringent corrective
action plan outlining in detail what will be done. If
it fails to do so, the Council may ultimately impose
fines on the member state.
As the EIP procedure is the stronger, it should – as
a rule – adopt the ESRB recommendations and
incorporate them in the EIP to the extent that
these recommendations are of relevance to
macroeconomic imbalances. This would also help
to make these recommendations consistent with
the broader macroeconomic strategy. By doing so,
the core ESRB recommendations would be made
legally binding and their effectiveness would be
increased.
Institutional conflicts are possible
There is the potential for conflict between the
ESRB and the Commission. Consider a situation in
which the Commission thinks that there is a
macroeconomic imbalance in a country's housing
market, which risks destabilising the financial
system. Then suppose that after a discussion in
the ESRB, the majority of the ESRB dismisses this
interpretation. This different interpretation could,
for example, reflect conflicts of interest between
monetary policy and financial stability consider-
ations12. The difference in assessment could also
12. See for example, Pisani-




CONTRIBUTION Guntram Wolff THE EURO AREA'S MACROECONOMIC BALANCING ACT
reflect different interpretations of what consti-
tutes a harmful imbalance or simply reflect differ-
ent degrees of risk aversion on the part of central
bankers and the Commission.
In such a situation, the European Commission
would – despite the ESRB's vote – be obliged to
give a recommendation to the Council in the
framework of the EIP. This obligation directly
derives from the Treaty, which requires the Com-
mission to act, and it is also reflected in the Article
6 of the proposed EIP regulation13. Clearly, the EIP
procedure gives the European Commission a
much stronger position than its role in the ESRB. In
the ESRB it is 'just' one ordinary member among
many with voting rights. However, in the EIP, both
the new regulation and the Treaty require it to act
in case it considers there to be an imbalance. Thus
the Commission can override the ESRB judgment
using the EIP procedure.
The confidentially of information available to the
ESRB should not be a relevant dimension in the
Commission’s assessment. Even if the informa-
tion discussed by the ESRB is confidential and the
Commission comes to the conclusion based on
this confidential information that there is an
imbalance, it will probably need to use this infor-
mation and call for a procedure because of its
Treaty obligations. As the Commission would be
bound by the ESRB's confidentiality agreement, it
would not be allowed to publish this information.
Nevertheless, it would have to take it into account
as clearly stipulated in Article 5(2) of the draft EIP
regulation.
Conversely, it is of course also possible that the
ESRB concludes that an imbalance with systemic
risk is building up and decides to issue a warning,
while the Commission does not take this view. In
this case, the Commission would not take up the
warning or recommendation of the ESRB and there
would be no follow-up in the EIP procedure of the
ESRB decision.
‘It will be important to keep the focus of the EIP procedure on imbalances. Broadening the scope
of the procedure would only water-down its effectiveness in preventing harmful developments
that cost us so dearly.’
4  MAXIMISING THE BENEFITS OF THE ESRB AND
EIP
1. There is an overlap between the ESRB's respon-
sibilities and the EIP procedure when dealing
with the fundamentally important issue of
asset-market developments leading to macro-
economic imbalances. Policy action in this area
is difficult for both the ESRB and under the EIP
because of informational problems and politi-
cal economy pressures. The current approach
emphasises careful economic analysis of the
underlying problems leading to tailor-made rec-
ommendations. This approach will allow spe-
cific problems to be identified. It would be
useful to complement the approach with rules-
based policy instruments that automatically
dampen credit and asset-market cycles in
order to reduce the information and political
economy problems. First, rules would not
require an assessment of an imbalance to be
made but would be tied to easily observable
headline figures. Second, agreeing on such a
set of measures might be easier as it could be
done at a very early stage before a boom. This
rules-based approach would address some –
though not all – of the problems arising from
macroeconomic imbalances.
2. It does not appear to be advisable to get rid of
the overlap by changing the nature of the EIP
procedure by requiring it to focus on real econ-
omy developments only. One of the central les-
sons of the crisis is that financial and real
economic developments cannot be separated.
Narrowing the focus to real developments only
would therefore lead to wrong policy conclu-
sions. At the same time, it will be important to
keep the focus of the EIP on imbalances. Broad-
ening the scope of the procedure would only
water down its effectiveness in preventing
harmful developments that cost us so dearly.
Conversely, for the ESRB to focus on narrowly
defined financial-sector issues only does not
appear advisable as it would make assessment
and policy recommendation difficult.
13. “If,..., the Commission
considers that a Member
State is experiencing imbal-
ances, it shall inform the
Council accordingly.” (Art
6(1) or similar in Art 7(1)
for the corrective arm). At
the same time of informing
the Council of the imbal-
ance, the Commission
would typically also need to
issue a recommendation
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3. The EIP procedure is more powerful than the
ESRB because the Council can make the Com-
mission's recommendations legally binding
with the ultimate threat of sanctions in case of
non-compliance. In the ideal and probably most
likely case, the assessments of the ESRB and
the Commission will coincide in the areas of
overlap. In such a case, the Commission could
take on board – as a rule – the ESRB's recom-
mendations in the EIP. The main obstacle to this
is the exclusive country focus of the EIP while
the ESRB can issue recommendations to the
Union, member states, the European supervi-
sory authorities and national supervisors.
While in practice this problem could be solved
by issuing recommendations to all member
states, it is worthwhile considering an amend-
ment to the EIP draft regulation to allow for rec-
ommendations to parties other than the
member state14.
4. In case of disagreement between the Commis-
sion and the ESRB where competences overlap,
a choice needs to be made which institution
should have the final say. The current set-up
clearly gives the priority to the Commission as
the Treaty (Article 121) gives the right of ini-
tiative to the Commission. A more binding
follow-up from the Commission, especially in
the area of financial recommendations, when
they have implications for macroeconomic
imbalances, could be considered15. By choos-
ing this option, the weight of the ESRB would
significantly increase and systemic risk with
macroeconomic relevence would be more
forcefully addressed. Such a modification
would have to be done in a way compatible with
Article 121 of the TFEU.
5. On a working level, it will be important that
ESRB and Commission staff closely interact so
that information, knowledge and ideas are
exchanged early in the process. Such an
exchange should go beyond the exchange in
the ESRB itself, where the Commissioner is a
member. Regular meetings between Commis-
sion staff, the head of the ESRB secretariat and
the heads of the advisory scientific and tech-
nical committees, should take place so that
synergies in the assessment and the policy for-
mulation are maximised
6. Finally, The European Parliament should insist
that policy recommendations are followed-up.
To do so, it should hold Commission, ESRB and
national governments accountable, for exam-
ple by requiring them to testify on concrete
policy measures taken. This could be done by,
for example, requiring national authorities to
report to the European Parliament on if and how
they have fulfilled their obligations according
to both the ESRB and the EIP. Moreover, the
European Parliament may play an important
role in case of disagreement between the ESRB
and EIP as it holds the Commission and the
ESRB democratically accountable. 
‘The European Parliament should insist that policy recommendations are followed-up. To do so, it
should hold Commission, ESRB and national governments accountable, for example by requiring
them to testify on concrete policy measures taken.’
14. This appears all the
more necessary because
the EIP draft regulation
clearly speaks of the poten-
tial of an imbalance to
affect the proper function-
ing of the Union as a whole
(Article 2).
15. In the draft EIP Regula-
tion, the Commission must
only “take into account”
early warnings and recom-
mendations from the ESRB
(Article 5(2)). Instead, the
Commission could be
required to automatically
“include” the ESRB’s warn-
ings and recommendations
in its in-depth study. Should
it choose not to do so, it
could be required to explain,
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